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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's preference for narrow rulings that adhere
closely to precedent and that avoid grand pronouncements is well-known.1
Commentators have noted her judicial moderation in fields as diverse as
abortion tights,2 affirmative action, civil procedure,4 death penalty
jurisprudence, 5 and even gender discrimination, the area of law in which she
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1 See Jason J. Czamezki, William K. Ford & Lori A. Ringhand, An Empirical
Examination of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of the Rehnquist Natural
Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 140 tbl.B (2007) (finding that Justice Ginsburg voted
to alter precedent in 1.5% of the cases decided between 1994-2004, with only Justice
Souter demonstrating less willingness to do so at 1.3%, and Justice Thomas being most
willing to do so at 4.3%).
2 See Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai Wang, When Is an Innovation in Order?: Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stare Decisis, 20 U. RAW. L. REv. 835, 861 (1998) (noting
Ginsburg's belief that Roe v. Wade "ventur[ed] too far in the change it ordered") (quoting
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1199
(1992)).
3 See Toni J. Ellington, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Marshall Harlan: A Justice
and Her Hero, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 797, 811 (1998) ("Ginsburg's desire to leave major
changes in the law to the state legislatures is especially evident in her writings on
affirmative action cases.").
4 See Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REv. 647, 695 (1998) ("Aware
of the precedential impact of her opinions [in the class action area], she is careful not to
articulate a view that may be used in a future case to disrupt the balance among process
values.").
5 See Sidney Harring & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Scrupulous in Applying the Law:
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y. CrrY L. REV. 241, 269
(2004) ("In her death penalty opinions, Justice Ginsburg has been consistently
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is considered a pioneer.6 Nor is this caution about things legal new with her
ascent to the Supreme Court. It was also evident in her thirteen years on the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 7 as well as during her tenure as an advocate
with the ACLU.8 Justice Ginsburg herself has noted the cautious nature of
her judicial philosophy, both before and after she joined the Supreme Court. 9
As she said at her confirmation hearing, a judge should "strive to write
opinions that both 'get it right' and 'keep it tight."
0
At the same time, Justice Ginsburg believes that the Constitution is a
dynamic document rather than a frozen text that must be interpreted in light
of practices that existed at the time of the Framers. Thus, as she has recently
written, the Constitution should be read "as belonging to a global twenty-first
century, not as fixed forever by eighteenth-century understandings.""
Indeed, in one analysis of confirmation hearing statements by the nine
Justices who were on the Court in 2004, Justice Ginsburg was considered the
Justice who was least committed to originalism theories, 2 a finding that
presumably would not change now that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito have joined the Court. None of this means, of course, that Justice
'scrupulous in applying law on the basis of legislation and precedent .. ") (citing Kuo
& Wang, supra note 2, at 863).
6 See Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 629, 634 (2003) ("Even in the area of gender discrimination, where she might be
expected to celebrate bolder judicial action, Ginsburg prefers these 'measured motions."')
(quoting Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1198).
7 See Sheila M. Smith, Comment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sexual
Harassment Law: Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice Become the Court's
Women's Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1893, 1905 (1995) (noting that as an
appellate judge, Justice Ginsburg adhered to the notion that "appellate courts, even the
United States Supreme Court, must tread carefully when developing new doctrine, going
only as far as necessary for the instant case to be decided and building upon previous
precedent whenever possible") (citing Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1198-1208).
8 Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination,
20 U. HAW. L. REv. 699, 720 (describing Justice Ginsburg in her days at the ACLU as
"[a] firm believer in precedent [who] recognized the need for a well-developed, long-
range strategy to chip away at precedent, to establish new principles incrementally...").
9 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1198-99 (criticizing Roe, and asserting that
"[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove unstable").
10 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 53
(1993) (statement of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
11 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect for the Opinions of[Human]kind": The
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 351, 355 (2005) (keynote address at the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, April 1, 2005).
12 Czamezki, Ford & Ringhand, supra note 1, at 142 tbl.D.
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Ginsburg ignores Framers' "intent" when that elusive mental state can be
discerned; rather she believes the overriding intent of the Framers was to
draft a document that is flexible rather than static.
On the surface, at least, these two tenets-a preference for circumspect
rulings adhering closely to precedent and rejection of originalism as the
dispositive interpretive guidepost-are in some tension. But change can
come in small steps as well as giant leaps; these two notions, when
combined, suggest that Justice Ginsburg believes that it is important to re-
interpret the Constitution in light of the times, but that such re-interpretations
should be arrived at, as she puts it, in "measured motions." 13 Or as she has
more whimsically stated, the best judges are those with "open, but not drafty,
minds .... ,14 Cass Sunstein has referred to a similar approach as
minimalism.15 Here, however, I will call it gradualism, because the latter
term suggests movement in a particular direction, albeit only minimally with
respect to any given decision. Thus, for instance, Justice Ginsburg's long
crusade aimed at making gender a suspect classification-a crusade that has
in large measure been successful-consisted of a number of incremental
moves, 16 but all pushing toward a particular goal.
Justice Ginsburg believes that gradualism is not only required by the
judicial role but also strategically beneficial. As she said in an article
criticizing the decision in Roe v. Wade, 17 "[W]ithout taking giant strides and
thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the Court, through
constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or signal a green light for a social
change."18 The tactic of nibbling away so as to not alarm may well explain
why she continues to "tinker with the machinery of death," something her
colleague Justice Harry Blackmun ultimately refused to do,' 9 as did Justices
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall before her time.2° Justice Ginsburg
13 Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1198 ("Measured motions seems to me right, in the
main, for constitutional as well as common law adjudication.").
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 45 (1986).
15 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT ix (Harvard University Press 1999).
16 See Ray, supra note 6, at 635; see also Ellington et al., supra note 8, at 720-63
(recounting Justice Ginsburg's gender discrimination jurisprudence through three decades
of decision-making).
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1208.
19 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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may believe that fiddling with the death penalty-by insisting on time-
consuming and expensive procedural regularity and occasionally narrowing
its scope in cases like Atkins v. Virginia," Roper v. Simmons,22 and Kennedy
v. Louisiana23-is the only feasible way of ultimately doing away with
capital punishment or rendering it moot.
To date, no one has taken a sustained looked at Justice Ginsburg's
approach to decision-making in the area of criminal procedure, by which I
mean the types of subjects normally taught in law schools under that name,
including search and seizure, interrogation, the right to counsel, trial rights,
sentencing procedures, and the criminal appeals and collateral review
processes. 24 It turns out, not surprisingly, that here too there is evidence of
Justice Ginsburg's gradualism. After surveying Justice Ginsburg's
contribution to the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, this
article zeroes in on her decisions regarding search and seizure law under the
Fourth Amendment, which comprise far and away the largest category of
constitutional criminal procedure cases and thus provide the most fertile
ground for assessing Justice Ginsburg's gradualist tendencies and their
impact.
I. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Nowhere is it more obvious where a Justice stands on civil rights issues
than in criminal cases, where the battle lines between the state and the
individual are usually clearly drawn. Some commentators have lamented that
Justice Ginsburg has not sided with the defense as often as one might expect
from a Justice appointed by a Democratic president and hailing from the
ACLU.25 Of Justice Ginsburg's seventy-one written opinions (majority and
21 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (exempting people with mental retardation from the
death penalty).
22 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (exempting juveniles from the death penalty).
23 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646, 2664 (2008) (exempting child molesters from the death
penalty).
24 Cases on substantive criminal law, the federal rules of evidence, and the ex post
facto clause were excluded in this survey.
25 See Joyce Ann Baugh, Christopher E. Smith, Thomas R. Hensley & Scott Patrick
Johnson, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 1,
29 (1994) ("Although she ultimately supported liberal outcomes in a majority of cases,
she did not fulfill liberals' hopes, even with respect to the death penalty issue upon which
she had been so evasive during her confirmation hearings."); see also Edward Lazarus,
The Transformation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as the Roberts Court Shifts from
Harmony and Consensus to Bitter Division (June 21, 2007)
http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/lazarus/20070621.html (calling Ginsburg "[o]riginally an
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concurring) dealing with criminal procedure since she joined the Court in
1993, forty-two have sided with the defense but twenty-nine (or over 40%)
have agreed with a result favoring the prosecution.26 In the 266 criminal
procedure opinions which she joined but did not write, her vote supported the
government in 110 (or over 41%) of the cases.27 Combining both written and
joined opinions (a total of 337 through the 2008 Term), she voted for the
prosecution in 41.2% of the criminal procedure cases decided during her
tenure on the Court.28 One can see how this percentage could be
disappointing to some defense advocates.
These numbers require some context, however. Researchers who have
looked at voting patterns in all criminal cases (not just criminal procedure
cases) have found that several Warren Court Justices, such as Justice
Marshall and Justice Brennan, voted for the prosecution's side noticeably
less often (20% and 27%, respectively) than Justice Ginsburg.29 But the only
current Justice who approaches Justice Ginsburg's tendencies on this score is
Justice Stevens, who has voted for the government in approximately 37% of
the criminal cases in which he participated.30 A study that looked at all the
Court's procedural and substantive criminal decisions between 1994 (the
year after Justice Ginsburg joined the Court) and 2004 put Justice Ginsburg
in what the survey authors called the "liberal" camp in 63.1% of the
opinions, with only Justice Stevens opting for that position more often (at
72.9%). 31 And a survey of all of the Court's criminal justice decisions since
2005 (the beginning of the Roberts Court era) found that Justice Ginsburg
outwardly bland moderate known for denying rumors of internal Court strife," but also
noting that "[she] has changed quite radically into a passionate, even bitter, dissenter
from the increasingly conservative drift of the Roberts era").
26 See Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure Cases in Which Justice Ginsburg
Participated (chart on file with author and Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter
Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases]. With respect to each criminal procedure case
decided by the Supreme Court since Justice Ginsburg joined the Court (see supra note 24
and accompanying text for definition of "criminal procedure case"), this chart provides:
(1) citation; (2) type of opinion that Ginsburg authored or joined (majority, dissent, or
concurrence, unanimous, and unanimous with concurring opinion); (3) legal genre (e.g.,
Fourth Amendment; habeas); (4) the issue or holding; and (5) whether Ginsburg sided
with the prosecution or the defense. Cases in which Justice Ginsburg authored an opinion
are in bold.
27 Id.
28 See id.
29 Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How
the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court's Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94
GEO. L.J. 1385, 1413 tbl.2 (2006).
30 Id.
31 Czarneski, Ford & Ringhand, supra note 1, at 149.
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was the most "liberal" justice, voting in that direction 80% of the time, with
Justice Souter next at 74%, and Justices Alito and Thomas bringing up the
rear at 14% and 19%, respectively.32 Meanwhile, in the fifteen years of
Justice Ginsburg's tenure, the Supreme Court as a whole has decided for the
defense in only about 35% of its criminal justice cases, close to the converse
of Justice Ginsburg's decision-making proclivities in that area of law. 33
Moreover, these general data obscure two important aspects of the
decisions in which Justice Ginsburg joined in a government-oriented opinion.
First, many of these opinions have been concurrences that distance her from
the majority's holding. Nineteen of the twenty-nine government-oriented
opinions that she authored, or over 65%, were concurrences of this type, and
seventeen of the 110 government-oriented opinions that she joined but did
not write were also concurrences.34 That still leaves a number of Ginsburg
votes-specifically 103 (or about 31%) of the Court's 337 criminal
procedure opinions-that favor an unabashedly prosecution position. But
here, the second unremarked aspect of her voting patterns is important to
note. Many of these latter decisions were unanimous, meaning that even the
other "liberals" on the Court were willing to go along. Of the eleven
Ginsburg-authored government-oriented majority opinions, six were
unanimous, and almost two-thirds of the remaining ninety-five government-
oriented opinions (sixty) were joined by all Justices who participated.35
Turning to specific aspects of criminal procedure, Justice Ginsburg's
defense-orientation has been particularly noticeable in three areas. The first is
sentencing, where she has expressed strong support for expanding the role of
juries in dispositional decision-making.36 Justice Ginsburg was in the
majority in the three leading cases in this area, Apprendi v . New Jersey,37
32 Christopher E. Smith, Michael A. McCall & Madhavi M. McCall, The Roberts
Court and Criminal Justice at the Dawn of the 2008 Term, 3 CHARLESTON L. REv. 265,
271 tbl.2 (2009).
33 Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives
Should Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REV. 651, 662
(2008) (noting that the Rehnquist Court decided for the prosecution in 66% of its criminal
cases, while the Roberts Court, in its first two terms, decided similarly in 64% of its
criminal cases).
34 Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
35 A few of these "unanimous" opinions featured concurring opinions that Justice
Ginsburg did not join. Id.
36 See The Supreme Court 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REv. 225, 230
(2007) ("Justice Ginsburg's seemingly formalistic rejection of the dissenters' state-
oriented and defendant-oriented models may in fact signal the reemergence of an
antiquated theory about one of the Sixth Amendment's purposes: to preserve meaningful
citizen participation in the judicial process.").
37 530 U.S. 466, 475-76 (2000).
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Blakely v. Washington,38 and United States v. Booker,39 all of which
interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to prohibit imposition of a
sentence beyond statutory or guidelines maxima unless the enhancing facts
are proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And she authored the
majority opinions in Ring v. Arizona40 (interpreting Apprendi to require that
facts supporting a death sentence be proven to a jury); Cunningham v.
California41 (interpreting Blakely and Booker to strike down a California
sentencing regime that permitted judges to impose upper term limits based on
their own factual findings); and Greenlaw v. United States42 (holding that a
court of appeals may not, on its own, order an increase in sentence). She also
dissented in Washington v. Recuenco,43 arguing, contrary to the majority's
ruling, that a failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is a "structural
error.
' 4
Another body of criminal procedure law in which Justice Ginsburg has
played a conspicuous role is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In the
twenty-seven cases decided in the past fifteen years that addressed whether
defendants are entitled to counsel or received effective assistance of counsel,
Justice Ginsburg voted for the defense in nineteen (or 70%), well over her
58% average in criminal procedure cases generally.45 She authored majority
opinions in Alabama v. Shelton,46 which required counsel at proceedings at
which the defendant receives a suspended sentence, as well as in Halbert v.
38 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
39 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
40 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
41 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007).
42 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2570 (2008).
43 548 U.S. 212, 229 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44 At the same time, Justice Ginsburg has signed onto opinions that permit sentences
to be based on judge-determined facts in sentencing regimes where the maxima are
"advisory." Id.; see, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007) (holding that
trial judges need not find "extraordinary" circumstances to depart from guidelines range);
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that appellate courts may
presume reasonableness of a sentence based on judge-found factors if it is within the
federal sentencing guidelines). And she wrote the majority opinions in Kimbrough v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007) (holding that a downward departure for a
sentence in a cocaine case should have been upheld by the appellate court), and in
Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 718 (2009) (holding that the judge may find facts
necessary to impose a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence because "no erosion of
the jury's traditional role was at stake" in such a process).
45 See Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
46 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002).
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Michigan,47 which mandated counsel for defendants who seek leave to
appeal a guilty plea. She also usually found counsel to be ineffective in
capital cases.4 8 In the one case in which she authored a majority opinion that
found against a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim, Florida v. Nixon,49 the
entire Court agreed with her conclusion that a defense attorney who concedes
the guilt of his client at a capital murder trial is not ineffective when the
client refuses to provide the attorney with any direction, the attorney satisfies
himself that his client's guilt is overwhelming, and the attorney goes on to
argue vigorously for mitigation at sentencing. And in her most recent
majority opinion in a criminal procedure case, involving the right to speedy
trial, she made the eye-opening statement that "[d]elay resulting from a
systemic 'breakdown in the public defender system,' could be charged to the
State,"5° which might open the door to ineffective assistance claims based on
the same "breakdown" theory. 51 Justice Ginsburg's allegiance to the right to
counsel is matched, perhaps inevitably, only by her hostility to the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation, which she has been willing to limit
in four opinions she has written or joined.52
47 545 U.S. 605, 623-24 (2005).
48 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel in a capital case); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003)
(same); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398-99 (2000) (same); see also Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 209 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concerning a capital case
where majority held no constitutionally cognizable conflict arose when defendant's
attorney had been representing victim at time of death). But see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 702 (2002) (where Justice Ginsburg joined an opinion holding that a state court's
determination in a capital case that counsel was not deficient not unreasonable). The
latter case came back to the Supreme Court last term on a Brady claim, which the Court,
with Ginsburg in the majority, held was justiciable on federal habeas. Cone v. Bell, 129
S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2009).
49 543 U.S. 175 (2004)
50 Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009) (citing State v. Brillon, 955
A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008)).
51 Cf State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783 (La. 1993) (holding that low funding
levels, high caseloads, and inadequate investigative support all combined to create a
"rebuttable presumption" in every criminal case that public defenders were providing
ineffective assistance of counsel).
52 See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2385-86 (2008) (finding no pro se right
for competent but mentally ill defendants); Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (per
curiam) (finding no right to a prison library); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 93-94 (2004)
(Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court finding no right to be informed of fact that
attorney might alert defendant to possible defenses); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (finding no right to represent oneself on direct appeal).
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A final criminal procedure area that is of special interest to Justice
Ginsburg concerns the jurisdictional aspects of the writ of habeas corpus, 53
both as a constitutional and a statutory matter. Almost 20% of her written
opinions have dealt with this issue: six majority opinions, four dissents and
three concurrences.54 Although three of her majority opinions favored the
prosecution, 55 overall, as with the right to counsel issue, she voted for the
petitioner in over 70% (forty-three) of the Court's cases grappling with the
writ of habeas corpus,56 including in every one of the cases contesting the
Bush Administration's attempts to exempt its war on terrorism from federal
court jurisdiction.57
Further evidence of Justice Ginsburg's leanings is found in the fact that
she has even signed onto pro-defendant opinions that could put her at odds
with her feminist colleagues. In Georgia v. Randolph,58 the Court held, 5-3
(Justice Alito not participating) that a man's refusal to let police inside a
home superseded his estranged wife's desire to let them enter the premises,
in a setting reeking of domestic discord.59 In Davis v. Washington,6° the
Court held, with one dissenter, that a woman's hearsay statements about
domestic abuse obtained by a responding officer after the alleged abuser had
departed were "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment, and thus not
admissible. 6' And in Giles v. California,62 the Court reversed a lower court's
53 Excluded from this discussion are cases in which the writ of habeas corpus is used
merely as a vehicle for determining the substantive law of criminal procedure, including
cases governing retroactive application of the law under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
315-16 (1989) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (granting federal habeas relief only
when the state court ruling was an "unreasonable" application of existing law).
54 See Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
55 See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354-55 (1994) (holding that speedy trial claims
are not cognizable on habeas); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 649-50 (2005) (holding that
amended habeas petition does not relate back when it asserts a new ground for relief
supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those set forth in the original
pleading); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (holding that a federal court
may dismiss a federal habeas petition as untimely even when state concedes timeliness
issue).
56 See Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
57 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 128
S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004).
58 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
59 See id at 106.
60 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
61 See id. at 834.
62 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
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admission of a murder victim's hearsay statements about threats of physical
violence the defendant made toward her, holding, 6-3, that under the Sixth
Amendment such statements are not admissible unless the prosecution shows
that the defendant had the specific intent at the time of the murder to prevent
the victim from testifying against him.63 In these cases, all of which Justice
Ginsburg joined (the latter in a concurrence), any gender-based concerns she
may have had about the holding were trumped by her view of history and
precedent, a view that happens to coincide with a staunchly liberal view of
defendants' constitutional rights.
So Justice Ginsburg's criminal procedure jurisprudence is decidedly
defense-oriented compared to most other justices, present and past. A
separate issue, much harder to get a handle on, has to do with the nature of
her defense-orientation. The defense bar's disappointment about her
decision-making, to the extent it exists, might have more to do with the
perception that her support of defense-oriented positions is somewhat lacking
in intensity, and thus has not had a significant impact as it might have had. In
other words, her pro-defense tendencies may appear to be too gradualist to
many with a defense-minded perspective.
The actual impact of Justice Ginsburg's penchant for gradualism in
criminal procedure cases is difficult to determine in other than a speculative
way. By definition, gradualism can only have a major impact over several
cases, all of which focus on the same constitutional doctrine (because a
gradualist approach does not contemplate pronouncements that bleed over
into other doctrines). Despite the fifteen-year span of Justice Ginsburg's
career on the Supreme Court, there is a paucity of data of this type. Cases
dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination or double jeopardy under
the Fifth Amendment, the right to counsel, jury trial and confrontation under
the Sixth Amendment, and free-standing procedural due process issues under
the Fourteenth Amendment are too few and too disparate to enable one to
discern any definitive patterns. While, as recounted above, opinions
construing the scope of habeas review are more numerous, they too are
disconnected doctrinally, and frequently too technical as well, to permit any
kind of meaningful assessment of progression in a particular area.
One criminal procedure arena that does provide a big enough sample
allowing such an assessment is search and seizure caselaw, which since 1993
has comprised close to one-fifth of the Court's criminal procedure docket. A
more detailed look at how Justice Ginsburg's brand of gradualism has fared
in the Fourth Amendment context provides some interesting insights.
63 See id. at 2684.
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II. JUSTICE GINSBURG AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
At first glance, Justice Ginsburg's contribution to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence appears miniscule. During her fifteen-year tenure, she wrote
only four majority opinions out of sixty-one decisions on search and seizure,
and in none of them was the Court closely divided.64 But the small number of
opinions takes on a different light when one realizes that only eighteen of
those sixty-one cases resulted in a defense victory; 65 few opportunities to
write majority opinions arose for her, given her generally defense-oriented
bent.
In light of that bent, a bit more surprising is the fact that Justice Ginsburg
sided with the government in twenty-nine of the Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions (including one of the four majority opinions she authored).66 That
number represents almost 50% of the search and seizure docket, a proportion
noticeably higher than her pro-government tendencies in criminal procedure
cases generally. However, in sixteen of these twenty-nine cases the opinions
were unanimous, suggesting that the government had a particularly strong
argument.6 7 Moreover, in six of the remaining thirteen cases she wrote
concurrences distancing herself from the majority holding, and in another
four she joined concurring opinions that did the same.68 That leaves just three
cases in which she fully joined a conservative majority against one or more
of her liberal colleagues.6 9 Thus, although she abhors these types of labels,7 °
64 See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009) (unanimous opinion
permitting frisk of car passenger when citation is issued to driver); Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266, 268 (2000) (unanimous decision that tip regarding the location and clothing of
person alleged to be carrying a gun is insufficient for reasonable suspicion); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (by a vote of 8-1, invalidating drug testing program for
political officials); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (by a vote of 7-2, holding
that the rule that arraignment must take place within forty-eight hours of arrest is
retroactive).
65 See Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
66See id. The one majority opinion Justice Ginsburg wrote supporting the
government in a Fourth Amendment case came in Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 784, and is
discussed in more detail below.
67 See Ginsburg Criminal Procedure Cases, supra note 26.
68 See id. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a concurrence in Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct.
1598, 1608 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), a unanimous prosecution-oriented opinion
that is counted in the group of sixteen unanimous opinions rather than this group.
69 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 845 (2006) (6-3 vote); Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 327 (2001) (8-1 vote); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 409
(1997) (7-2 vote).
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Justice Ginsburg's liberal credentials are intact in the Fourth Amendment
area. She has been a firm advocate for the exclusionary rule,7' the bate noire
of conservatives, and she has also usually stood tall for individualized
suspicion requirements in the face of claims that the exigencies of law
enforcement should eliminate them.72
Justice Ginsburg's approach to search and seizure issues evidences two
types of gradualism. Occasionally, Justice Ginsburg has been able to engage
in what might be called "positive" gradualism, writing or joining a majority
opinion that tries to emulate her incrementally-attained success in gender
discrimination cases by moving the Court in a defendant-oriented direction.
The best example of this type of gradualism is her majority opinion on behalf
70 In her confirmation testimony Justice Ginsburg stated: "My approach, I believe, is
neither 'liberal' nor 'conservative.' Rather it is rooted in the place of the judiciary--of
judges-in our democratic society." 18 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1993: RUTH BADER
GINSBURG 260 (Roy M. Mersky et al. eds., 1995).
71 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(opposing the Court's rejection of rule's application to search incident to arrest based on
stale warrant); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(Justice Ginsburg joining a dissent to Court's rejection of rule's application to knock and
announce violations); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 370 (1998)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg joining a dissent to Court's rejection of rule's
application at parole proceedings); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's adoption of a good faith exception to the rule).
72 See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg's votes in Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251
(2007); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 552 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177,
197 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001);
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 33 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 309 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 567 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997). But Justice Ginsburg
has also voted against individualized suspicion requirements in several cases. See, e.g.,
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 845 (2006); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 104
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S.
149, 150 (2004); Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 666 (1995). From a liberal
perspective, probably the most troubling of the latter cases is Samson. As Justice Stevens
stated in his dissent, Samson is the first case to permit a suspicionless search outside a
"special needs" situation, a holding which could come back to haunt the liberal side of
the Court. See 547 U.S. at 857-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of a unanimous Court in Florida v. J.L. ,7 holding unconstitutional a stop
based on an anonymous tip. 74 Her opinion for the Court stated more than
once that an informant's accuracy about a person's noncriminal affairs "does
not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity,"
75
thus possibly setting the stage for a more direct repudiation of innuendo in
several Supreme Court decisions that police corroboration of innocent detail
alone is sufficient demonstration of informant reliability.
76
Most of Justice Ginsburg's gradualism, however, has been of the
"negative" variety, in which she has attempted to constrain a Supreme Court
whose membership is predominantly prosecution-oriented through
concurring or dissenting opinions suggesting limitations on the reach of the
majority's ruling. Of course, every Justice uses concurring and dissenting
opinions to advance circumscriptions of the Court's holding. But Justice
Ginsburg's non-majority opinions in the Fourth Amendment area, as on
criminal procedure topics generally, differ from the writings of many of these
other Justices; typically, rather than lambasting the majority for its blindness
or illogic in broad and far-reaching language, these concurrences pay close
attention to precedent and rely on precise "lawyerly" analysis detailing how
narrow the majority ruling is, or could be construed to be.
The rest of this article will focus on two Fourth Amendment cases-
Vernonia School District v. Acton77 and Ohio v. Robinette78-that, together
with their progeny, demonstrate this negative gradualism phenomenon. As
posited earlier, gradualism is based on the view that cases should be decided
one at a time, narrowly and according to precedent, but with the attitude that
the Constitution is not a rigid document and can be re-interpreted to take into
account changing realities. Both Vernonia and Robinette involve modem
phenomena unknown to the Framers---drug testing and car stops for traffic
citations, respectively-and both feature concurring opinions written by
73 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
7 4 1d. at 268.
75 Id. at 272.
76 See generally Peter Erlinder, Florida v. J.L.-Withdrawing Permission to "Lie
with Impunity": The Demise of "Truly Anonymous" Informants and the Resurrection of
the Aguilar/Spinelli Test for Probable Cause, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 57-79 (2001)
(making this argument). Similarly, in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), Justice Ginsburg joined a concurring opinion
written by Justice Scalia arguing that unless, as occurred in Thornton itself, there is
probable cause to believe evidence is in a car, police should not be able to search it once
its occupants have been arrested and placed in a police cruiser. That reasoning was
eventually adopted by a majority of the Court last term in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1713 (2009).
77 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
78 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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Justice Ginsburg concluding that precedent dictated a prosecution-oriented
result but that the majority's holding should be read narrowly. Analysis of
these cases and the cases related to them provides some insight into how
negative gradualism works, as well as some hints at how it might backfire.
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Vernonia, decided in 1995, was her
first in a Fourth Amendment case.79 As is true of many of her concurrences
(especially in her earlier years on the Court),0 it is extremely short,
providing the minimum explanation necessary to make clear the limits she
would impose on the majority's ruling. The other five members in the
majority in Vernonia, including her sometime liberal colleague Justice
Breyer, upheld the constitutionality of a drug testing program that focused on
high school student athletes, relying on past cases upholding drug testing of
railway workers and customs agents. 81 While Justice Ginsburg agreed with
this result, her concurrence briefly noted that the decision did not apply to
"all students required to attend school, 82 but only to students who chose to
participate in athletic programs, and cited to a Second Circuit opinion in
which Judge Friendly had sanctioned airport searches in part because people
can choose to avoid them by deciding not to fly.
83
Justice Ginsburg's reservation in Vernonia turned into a full-blown
dissent seven years later in Board of Education v. Earls,84 where five
members of the Court, including Justice Breyer, concluded that Vernonia's
rationale extended to students engaged in any type of extracurricular activity,
including cooking classes, animal husbandry, band, choir and academic
teams. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that these types of activities are much
more integrated into the school program and thus much less of an elective
than athletics; as she put it, "[s]tudents 'volunteer' for extracurricular
pursuits in the same way they might volunteer for honors classes: They
subject themselves to additional requirements, but they do so in order to take
79 In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), Justice
Ginsburg wrote a concurrence asserting that the petitioner's claim should have been
based on the Fourth Amendment, but the Court focused on whether the claim sounded in
due process.
80 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 471 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457-58 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 174-75 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); United States
v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 361 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
81 See 515 U.S. at 658-65 (relying in particular on Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
82 Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
83 See id. (citing United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)).
84 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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full advantage of the education offered them.,8 5 And she also noted that,
while significant drug problems had been documented among the student
athletes involved in Vernonia, no such demonstration had been made here, a
point she made in wonderfully sarcastic but typically understated language
that suggests her antipathy toward the Court's decision: "Notwithstanding
nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and
colliding tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of [the school], the great
majority of students the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in
activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual degree., 86 In support of
this approach to analyzing drug testing cases, she cited to her own majority
opinion in Chandler v. Miller,87 which had struck down a drug testing
program for politicians on the ground that the State had not been able to
show that the program responded to any "concrete danger."
88
Despite these arguments, she obviously failed to prevail in Earls. So the
negative gradualism of her Vernonia concurrence did not forestall a result
that Justice Ginsburg wanted to avoid. Would a more activist approach in the
latter case have made any difference? Perhaps not. But note that Justice
O'Connor, normally in the conservative camp, joined Justice Ginsburg's
dissent in Earls,89 a move consistent with her long dissent in Vernonia
castigating the majority for reasons similar to those Ginsburg gave in her
Earls dissent.90 Had Justice Ginsburg joined Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Vernonia or authored her own and thereby made Vernonia a 5-4 squeaker
instead of a 6-3 decision, one wonders whether Justice Breyer, who clearly
agonized over his deciding vote in Earls,9' might have gone the other way in
that case.
Even more troubling for someone of Justice Ginsburg's persuasion is the
likely result in the next student drug testing case, when it inevitably arrives at
the Court. Now that Justice Alito has replaced Justice O'Connor, it is very
likely there are five votes to approve the type of drug testing program that
Justice Ginsburg was most worried about in Vernonia-one aimed at all high
school students-even if Justice Breyer finally jumps ship on the issue. The
lesson one might draw about gradualism? While it can often be a successful
strategy, its slow pace might also exact significant costs.
85 Id. at 845-46.
86 Id. at 852.
87 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
8 8 1d. at 319.
89 536 U.S. at 842.
90 See 515 U.S. at 666 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91 See 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (calling the issue a "close question"
and implying that a different decision would be warranted if drug testing applied to the
entire school).
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Ohio v. Robinette, decided the year after Vernonia and featuring Justice
Ginsburg's second concurrence in a Fourth Amendment case, may have been
another missed opportunity to put the brakes on a majority intent on limiting
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In Robinette all members of the Court
agreed that, contrary to the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court, the Fourth
Amendment does not require the police to tell motorists who have been
issued a traffic citation that they are "free to go" in order to ensure that any
subsequent consent to search the car is voluntary.92 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion relied heavily on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,93 which
twenty-three years earlier had held that police need not tell individuals they
have a right to refuse consent to a police request to search.94 But Schneckloth
did not necessarily dictate the outcome in Robinette, which focused not on a
warning about the right to refuse consent but on whether police need to tell
stopped individuals when they are free to leave. Absent notification of their
rights, people are much more likely to believe they cannot terminate an
encounter with police than think they cannot refuse consent to a search, if
only because in the latter situation the police have to telegraph the existence
of the right by asking for consent. No such signal necessarily comes from the
police when they start asking questions about matters beyond the scope of
the initial stop.
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence implicitly recognized this point when she
quoted from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in the case that "[m]ost
people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as
the officer continues to interrogate them." 95 But calling Schneckloth
"controlling jurisprudence, 96 her opinion focused on the point that, on
remand, the Ohio courts could rely on its perception about people's typical
response to police stops and require, as a matter of state constitutional law, a
warning to motorists that they are free to leave before asking for consent.97
Only Justice Stevens worried explicitly about the fact that Robinette
appeared to allow suspicionless post-citation seizures for the purpose of
92 See 519 U.S. at 40.
93 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
94 See id at 249.
95 519 U.S. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
96 id. at 42.
97 Id. at 42-44. This is a type of observation that Justice Brennan championed-see
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977)-and that Justice Ginsburg has put forward in at least two
other opinions concerning the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct.
1598, 1609 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30-32
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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extracting consent or gathering incriminating information in some other
way.
98
Six years later this passivity came back to haunt the liberals on the Court
in United States v. Drayton, where the majority concluded that armed
officers are not engaging in a Fourth Amendment seizure when they board a
bus and ask passengers for consent to search their luggage without telling
them they are free to leave or refuse consent.99 Justice Kennedy cited
Robinette in writing for the six member majority (including Justice Breyer)
that "[t]he Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police
officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking
permission to conduct a warrantless consent search." 100 Justice Souter's
dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, repeated the concern of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Robinette: "It is very hard to imagine that either [of
the defendants] would have believed that he stood to lose nothing if he
refused to cooperate with the police, or that he had any free choice to ignore
the police altogether."' ' 1 And Justice Souter (and therefore, presumably,
Justice Ginsburg) came close to echoing the Ohio Supreme Court's solution
to this problem: "While I am not prepared to say that no bus interrogation
and search can [avoid Fourth Amendment regulation] without a warning that
passengers are free to say no, the facts here surely required more from the
officers than a quiet tone of voice.' 0 2
Robinette's implicit assumption that police may manipulate citizen
encounters without explanation or seeking affirmative consent has infected
other Court decisions that Justice Ginsburg has not liked. Most obviously,
that assumption seemed to underpin the Court's decision in Illinois v.
Caballes,' which held that a dog sniff of a car at a validly established
roadblock does not infringe Fourth Amendment interests so long as it does
not extend the length of the stop.' 4 Ironically, given his opinion in Robinette,
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Caballes, which focused on the
idea he had long advanced that when a police investigative technique, such as
a dog sniff, detects only the presence of contraband, no expectation of
privacy is violated. 0 5 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in dissent, however, even if
98 See 519 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
100 Id. at 206.
101 Id. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
104 See id. at 408.
105 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (in which Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that "governmental conduct that can reveal
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a dog sniff by itself is not a Fourth Amendment "search," when a dog is
brought in during a roadblock "[t]he stop becomes broader, more adversarial,
and (in at least some cases) longer. 10 6
Although she did not say so, and may not have realized it, the same
statement could have characterized how the traffic stop in Robinette was
changed by the officer's continued questioning of the motorist and
subsequent request for consent. There, after issuing the citation, the officer
had said, "One question before you get gone: Are you carrying any illegal
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like
that?"'0 7 After Robinette said no, the officer asked for consent to search the
car. 08 Here too police actions made the stop "broader," "more adversarial"
and "longer."'
09
Thus, as in Vernonia, so in Robinette: a narrow initial take on an issue
made later incursions into Fourth Amendment protections easier (although
unlike in Earls, where only Justice Breyer needed to be coaxed to change his
position, the dissenters in Drayton and Caballes would have had to sway one
or more of the traditionally conservative justices to their side to prevent the
holdings in those two cases). And in fact it may be that even Justice Ginsburg
has given up on the issue. Just this last Term in Arizona v. Johnson" she
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'private' fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest"). Justice Stevens relied on this aspect of Jacobsen in
Caballes. See 543 U.S. at 408-09.
106 543 U.S. at 421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107 519 U.S. at 35-36.
108 See id. at 36.
109 The same thing could be said about the police behavior in Muehler v. Mena, 544
U.S. 93 (2005), where police, with probable cause to believe a large, multi-dwelling
home housed a gang member and guns, detained and handcuffed everyone in the home,
including Mena, for two to three hours, during which time she was interrogated.
Although the Court did not address Mena's claim that the detention's continuation after
the police had determined she was not dangerous was unjustified, it did find that the
continued use of handcuffs and close supervision did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Robinette was not cited, but its influence was felt. See id at 100 ("The duration of a
detention can, of course, affect the balance of interests .... However, the 2- to 3-hour
detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government's continuing safety
interests."). Justice Stevens' concurrence, which Justice Ginsburg joined, fastened on the
duration point in arguing that the majority too blithely reached the quoted conclusion and
in suggesting the kinds of issues the lower courts should consider on remand: "In
short ... a jury could have reasonably found from the evidence that there was no
apparent need to handcuff Mena for the entire duration of the search and that she was
detained for an unreasonably prolonged period." Id. at 111 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
110 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009).
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authored a unanimous opinion for the Courtl"'-the only prosecution-
oriented majority opinion she has written in the Fourth Amendment context
and only one of eleven such opinions in criminal procedure cases overall'12
that permitted a police officer whose colleague had issued a traffic citation to
the driver of a stopped car both to ask a passenger in the car to get out and to
frisk that passenger. Although the Court seemed to assume that the frisk took
place while the original traffic stop was ongoing, and there was further
evidence that the officer had reason to believe the passenger was armed
before asking him to get out of the car," 13 Justice Ginsburg's language went
beyond those possible rationales for the decision in stating: "An officer's
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this
Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than
a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop." 1
4
To those not used to Fourth Amendment nuances, all of this may sound
like dancing on the head of a pin. What does it matter whether officers ask
questions unrelated to the original purpose of a stop or whether police actions
extend, by some imperceptible measure, the duration of a stop? The
additional intrusions seem de minimis and, as Robinette, Drayton, Caballes,
III Id. at 784.
112 See Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2148, 2152 (2009) (unanimous opinion
holding that re-litigation of the mental retardation issue in light of intervening Atkins
decision exempting people with mental retardation from the death penalty does not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1449, 1453
(2009) (unanimous opinion holding that judge's erroneous decision prohibiting defense
use of peremptory challenge on Batson grounds did not violate Constitution); Vermont v.
Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009) (7-2 opinion holding that public defenders are not
state actors for purposes of the speedy trial right); Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714, 717
(2009) (5-4 opinion holding that judge may find facts determining whether sentence will
be imposed consecutively or concurrently); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 200, 211
(2006) (5-4 opinion holding that federal court may dismiss a federal habeas petition as
untimely even when state conceded timeliness issue); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 647,
664 (2005) (7-2 opinion holding that trial and conviction do not qualify as conduct,
transaction or occurrence relevant to relation back doctrine); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
80-81 (2004) (unanimous opinion finding waiver of right to counsel voluntary); Florida
v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 177, 192 (2004) (unanimous opinion finding no ineffective
assistance of counsel); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 306, 317 (2000)
(unanimous opinion holding that use of peremptory challenge to remove wrongfully
retained juror does not violate Sixth Amendment); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 341-42
(1994) (plurality opinion holding that speedy trial claim not cognizable on habeas).
113 See Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 784-85 (noting that the second officer attended to the
passenger "while" the first officer obtained the driver's license and that the passenger had
on gang clothing, possessed a scanner, and admitted to a prior burglary).
114 Id. at 788.
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and Johnson demonstrate, can result in discovering evidence of criminal
activity.
But as Justice Ginsburg herself recognized in Robinette in an admirable
attempt to put the case in a realistic, modem-world context, police routinely
use traffic stops to achieve other ends; she noted that the officer in that case
was not an ordinary traffic cop but rather was assigned to a drug interdiction
unit that depended on traffic violations as a way of obtaining "consent" to
search cars." 15 Many have pointed out that this law enforcement use of traffic
infractions, which occurs throughout the country, is the new version of the
general warrant, the practice upbraided by the colonists because it allowed
British soldiers to confront anyone they felt like investigating for sedition or
trafficking in uncustomed goods. 116 Because of their ubiquity and triviality,
traffic rules are routinely violated by all of us, a fact that gives the police
virtual carte blanche to stop anyone they want, just as the colonial writs of
assistance did. 1 7 In other words, the Robinette line of cases deals with one of
the most crucial issues arising under the Fourth Amendment: the
government's authority to detain and search without individualized
suspicion.
Abuse of that authority in the car stop context can have serious
consequences. The empirical evidence indicates that the vast proportion of
car searches do not result in the discovery of drugs or guns, and it also
suggests that most people whose cars are searched after traffic stops are
African-American or Hispanic 8 A failure to cabin executive authority in
these types of cases can have and has had a significant impact on Americans'
freedom and trust in government.' 19 Unfortunately, the Robinette line of
115 519 U.S. at 440 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
116 The pre-Revolutionary "writs of assistance," which permitted roving searches for
contraband, were reviled precisely because "they placed 'the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer."' See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
117 See, e.g., Barbara Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A
Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62
TEMP. L. REV. 221, 223 (1989).
118 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report.
Contacts Between Police and the Public 1 (2007) (reporting nationwide statistics from
2005 indicating that, while whites, blacks, and Hispanics were stopped at similar rates,
blacks and Hispanics were more than twice as likely to be searched by police and only
11.6% of the stops resulted in the discovery of drugs); David A. Harris, "Driving While
Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops,
87 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 561-66 (1997) (reporting study that found that drug-
free Hispanic and African-American drivers were far more likely to be stopped and
searched than drug-free white drivers).
119 Cf Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIo ST. J. CpdM. L. 231, 264
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cases enhances this kind of discretion. Had Robinette instead held that
drivers must be told they are free to leave after they receive a citation, or had
it in some other way limited post-citation inquiries,120 police and citizens
would know that not every traffic stop can be converted into a car search, a
frisk or an interrogation, and this modem version of the general warrant
would be exploited much less often. Of course, such a holding would have
been a long-shot given the make-up of the Court. But a strong dissent from
Justice Ginsburg in Robinette, bolstering Justice Stevens's, might have made
the majority think longer and harder before reaching its decision, and might
have also influenced votes down the road in cases that ended up reaffirming
and expanding the reach of that case.
III. CONCLUSION
The takeaway message from all of this is admittedly unclear. On the one
hand, the foregoing analysis of Justice Ginsburg's gradualism in Fourth
Amendment cases may indicate that chipping away at a holding instead of
taking a big swipe at it can leave a Justice with fewer options or less
influence down the road, or even lead one to forget why the chipping began
in the first place. On the other hand, this analysis is based, by necessity, on
speculation about the Justices' decision-making process and predilections.
Moreover, even if gradualism does have some downside, it clearly has many
benefits, as Justice Ginsburg and others have pointed out, and may in any
event be the only proper role for a judge in our tripartite system of
government. Perhaps all that can be said with certainty is that there are
degrees of gradualism and that the foregoing discussion hints at when, and
why, a bit more willingness to push the envelope might be worthwhile even
for a judge who tends to gradualist.
(2008) (reporting research showing that "people evaluate the legitimacy of the police
largely in terms of their judgments about the fairness by which the police exercise their
authority.").
120 Another solution to this problem would be to try to figure out whether the traffic
stop was a pretext to search, frisk, or interrogate, but that approach would require
difficult assessment of officers' mental states and in any event was foreclosed in Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), one of the unanimous prosecution-oriented
decisions that Justice Ginsburg joined. A third solution is to exclude evidence that is not
related to the initial purpose of the stop, which would remove the incentive to use stops
pretextually.
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